Any help with d) and e)will be appreciated 2. Paul and Stella play a game with three strategies each, T, M, and B for Paul, and L,C, and R for Stella. Both move simultaneously. The payoffs are given by thefollowing form:StellaLсRPaulT(8,4)(10, 2)(2,3)M(4,2)(10, 1)(5,7)B(1,4)(10, 3)(9,-4)a. Which strategy is dominated?b. What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? Identify all if there are more than one.c. If Paul moved first, so that Stella observed it, which strategy would Paul choose?Now assume the game is simplified into two strategies for each player. Paul plays T or B,and Stella plays L or R. They move simultaneously. The (new) payoffs are:StellaLRPaulT(3,1)(-1, -3)B(-2,-3)(1,4)d. What is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Identify all if there are more thanone.e. What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?

d) Pure strategy equilibrium To find out the pure strategy equilibrium, we use the best responses…

Now assume the game is simplified into two strategies for each player. Paul plays T or B, and Stella plays L or R. They move simultaneously. The (new) payoffs are: Stella L R Paul T (3,1) (-1,-3) B (-2,-3) (1,4) d. What is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Identify all if there are more than one. e. What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?

Now assume the game is simplified into two strategies for each player. Paul plays T or B, and Stella plays L or R. They move simultaneously. The (new) payoffs are: Stella L R Paul T (3,1) (-1,-3) B (-2,-3) (1,4) d. What is the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Identify all if there are more than one. e. What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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2. Paul and Stella play a game with three strategies each, T, M, and B for Paul, and L, C, and R for Stella. Both move simultaneously. The payoffs are given by the following form: Stella L с R Paul T (8,4) (10, 2) (2,3) M (4,2) (10, 1) (5,7) B (1,4) (10, 3) (9,-4) a. Which strategy is dominated? b. What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? Identify all if there are more than one. c. If Paul moved first, so that Stella observed it, which strategy would Paul choose?
3. Consider the game represented by the payoff matrix below: R S (12, 12) (8,-5) (25, 14) (50, 12) (26,70) (-2.6) (20, 100) (22,75) C (11,0) (3,25) (24, 26) (50,26) D (5,-10) (16,-8) (13,-8) (50,-20) A B a. Find the Nash equilibria of the game using any suitable method. b. Apply Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions (IESDA) to this game. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash equilibria found in part a. survive IESDA? c. Apply Iterated Elimination of (Weakly) Dominated Actions (IEDA) to this game by elim- inating all whakly dominated actions in each round. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash equilibria found in part a, survive IEDA
Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).
3) Consider the following two extensive form games and answer the following questions. How many subgames present in the following games? Find all pure strategies SPNE. Find all pure strategies NE of these games. Game A Game B u (5,3) u (0,2) 2 2 L L (-5,4) d (0,0) 1 1 1 (1,-5) (-10,-10) u R (2,3) A M 2 R 2 r d 1 (8,1) B (2,0) (2,2)
(d) Consider a simultaneous-move game between two firms choosing to sell their product at either £6, £7 or £8. The actions and payoffs are given in the matrix below. Firm 2's Prices £6 £7 £8 Firm 1's prices £6 4, 5 3, 5 2, 1 £7 0,4 2, 1 3,0 £8 -1, 1 4, 3 0, 2 What are the Nash equilibria of this game? Game theory is often used by firms competing under an oligopoly as a means of determining their best strategy. Why is game theory a useful tool and which characteristics of an oligopoly make it particularly useful for firms competing in this market structure? One outcome of an oligopoly is that firms may have an incentive to collude. Explain some of the conditions that make collusion more likely to occur and how game theory can explain why collusive agreements often break down.
Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S. Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw this extensive form game. (v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c = 1/2 and c = 3/2.
The following table contains the possible actions and payoffs of players 1 and 2. Player 1 U M D L 2,10 2,5 8,7 Player 2 C 5,2 11,8 8,4 R 5,4 2,9 8,3 This is a simultaneous move game. In a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, Player 1 receives a payoff of ✓and player 2 receives a payoff of If, instead of playing simultaneously, player 2 moves first, then in the Nash equilibrium player 1 receives a payoff of ✓and player 2 receives a payoff of
Find the unique Nash equilibrium of a game with the following payoff matrix: Player 2 2 4 1 (6, 7) (13, 8) (9, 9) Player 1 3 (4, 4) (7, 7) (7, 6) (7, 7) (11, 11) (7, 13) О a. (3, 2) O b. (5, 4) О с. (11, 11) O d. (1, 6) O e. There is no unique Nash equilibrium.
GAME UUU B1 Player B B2 A1 7,13 5, 10 A2 3,8 9,16 Player A A3 5,8 4,7 In Game UUU (see table above), assuming players move simultaneously, Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B3 is a Nash equilibrium. Player A choosing A3 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium. Both Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B1 and Player A choosing A2 and player B choosing B2 are Nash equilibria in pure strategies Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium.
GAME Z Player A B1 A1 7, 13 A2 3,8 Player B B2 15, 10 9,16 A3 5,8 4,7 In Game Z (see table above), assuming players move simultaneously. Which of the following is true? Player A has a dominant strategy Player B has a dominant strategy Both players have dominant strategies O Neither player has a dominant strategy
し(5,3) b I(2,2) も(0,0) (4,12) a (12.4) (0,0) i). List all subgame pertect Nash equilibria and name one Nash eqvilibrivm that is not subgame pertect i). How many strategies does playot and player 2 have?
Consider the following game: Player 1 T M B N R (1,2) (1,1) (3,4) (1,-1) L Player 2 (-1,2) (2, -1) (0,1) (4,4) S (3,2) (4,5) (5,4)) (6,1) Q (1,5) (1,2) (4,1) (1,4) a) Does player 1 (the row player) have any dominated strategies. If yes, list all such strategies b) Find all the Pareto Optimal strategy profiles in the game. c) Let 0= (1/2, 0,1/4,1/4). Find BR₂(0).