0 GAME UUU B1 Player B B2 A1 7, 13 5,10 A2 3,8 9,16 Player A A3 5,8 4,7 In Game UUU (see table above), assuming players move simultaneously, Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B3 is a Nash equilibrium. Player A choosing A3 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium. Both Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B1 and Player A choosing A2 and player B choosing B2 are Nash equilibria in pure strategies Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium.

0 GAME UUU B1 Player B B2 A1 7, 13 5,10 A2 3,8 9,16 Player A A3 5,8 4,7 In Game UUU (see table above), assuming players move simultaneously, Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B3 is a Nash equilibrium. Player A choosing A3 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium. Both Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B1 and Player A choosing A2 and player B choosing B2 are Nash equilibria in pure strategies Player A choosing A1 and Player B choosing B2 is a Nash equilibrium.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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