I need help with econ multiple hw questions asap!93) As the number of firms change in an oligopoly market, what will it become? A. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a monopoly market equilibrium B. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a competitive market equilibrium C. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a socially optimal equilibrium. D. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a cartel equilibrium.92) Refer to the attached Table 40. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, what will SuperDuper Saver's growth-related profits be? A. $25 B. $250 C. $85 D. $50 Table 4Two discount superstores (Ultimate Saver and SuperDuper Saver) in a growing urban area are interestedin expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot toaccommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomesthat result from the game. Growth-related profits of the two discount superstores under two scenarios arereflected in the table below.Table 4|SuperDuper SaverIncrease the size of storeand parking lotDo not increase the size ofstore and parking lotIncrease the sizeof store andparking lotDo not increasethe size of storeand parking lotUltimateSaverSuperDuper Saver = $50Ultimate Saver = $65SuperDuper Saver = $25Ultimate Saver = $275SuperDuper Saver = $250Ultimate Saver = $35SuperDuper Saver = $85Ultimate Saver = $135

93) As the number of firms change in an oligopoly market, what will it become? A. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a monopoly market equilibrium B. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a competitive market equilibrium C. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a socially optimal equilibrium. D. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a cartel equilibrium.

93) As the number of firms change in an oligopoly market, what will it become? A. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a monopoly market equilibrium B. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a competitive market equilibrium C. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a socially optimal equilibrium. D. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a cartel equilibrium.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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5 Suppose two players play one of the two normal-form games shown in Figure 1. L U 0,-1 D 2,4 R 2,0 6,0 L U | 4,-1 D 2,-2 R 2,0Now suppose that Player 2 knows which game is being played, but Player 1 does not. Find the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game.
Table 17-6 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits (in millions of dollars) of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the following figure. Lopes Do notincreasethe size of store and parking lot Increase the sizeof store and parking lot Lopes = 1.0 Lopes = 0.4 Increasethe size of store and parking lot HomeMax = 1.5 HomeMax = 3.4 HomeMax Lopes = 3.2 Lopes = 2.0 Do notincreasethe size of store and parking lot HomeMax = 0.6 HomeMax = 2.5 Refer to Table 17-6. When this game reaches a Nash equilibrium, annual profit will grow by a. $0.6 million for HomeMax and by $3.2 million for Lopes. b. $2.5 million for HomeMax and by $2.0 million for Lopes. c. $3.4 million for HomeMax and…
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table: Player 1 Player 2 Left Right Top 6 1 9 4 Bottom 2 4 5 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2. D) What is Player 1’s maximin strategy?E) What is Player 2’s maximin strategy?F) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose?
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