8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q,where q; is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market5demand is q(p) =-1p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and themarket is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market isА. 5В. 4С.3D. 2

Total revenue determines the amount earned from the quantity produced.Economic costs involve not…

8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q, where qi is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market demand is q(p) = - p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and the market is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market is A. 5 C. 3 D. 2 B. 4

8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q, where qi is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market demand is q(p) = - p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and the market is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market is A. 5 C. 3 D. 2 B. 4

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.4P

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