"Z" earns price "Z" earns $3 million $1 million ("Z") "W" earns "W" earns $1 million $2 million Low "Z" earns price "Z" earns $4 million $2 million val oligopolists in the coffee industry, Wide Awake and Zuma, have to decide on their pricing strategy. Each can either a high price or a low price. The table below shows the payoff matrix with the profit that each firm can to earn depending on the pricing strategy it adopts

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Wide Awake ("W")
"W" earns
"W" earns
$3 million
$4 million
High "Z"' earns
"Z"' earns
price
$3 million
$1 million
Zuma ("Z")
"W" earns
"W" earns
$1 million
$2 million
Low
price
"Z" earns
"Z" earns
$4 million
$2 million
Two rival oligopolists in the coffee industry, Wide Awake and Zuma, have to decide on their pricing strategy. Each can
choose either a high price or a low price. The table below shows the payoff matrix with the profit that each firm can
expect to earn depending on the pricing strategy it adopts
9.Refer to the payoff matrix above.
A. Assuming the firms do not coordinate their actions, what is the outcome of this game?
B. If the firms decide to collude, what prices will they select? Why?
10. Refer to the payoff matrix above.
A. If the two firms collude, is there an incentive for either to cheat on the collusion agreement? Explain.
B. In general, why do firms tend not to engage in price war?
High price
Low price
Transcribed Image Text:Wide Awake ("W") "W" earns "W" earns $3 million $4 million High "Z"' earns "Z"' earns price $3 million $1 million Zuma ("Z") "W" earns "W" earns $1 million $2 million Low price "Z" earns "Z" earns $4 million $2 million Two rival oligopolists in the coffee industry, Wide Awake and Zuma, have to decide on their pricing strategy. Each can choose either a high price or a low price. The table below shows the payoff matrix with the profit that each firm can expect to earn depending on the pricing strategy it adopts 9.Refer to the payoff matrix above. A. Assuming the firms do not coordinate their actions, what is the outcome of this game? B. If the firms decide to collude, what prices will they select? Why? 10. Refer to the payoff matrix above. A. If the two firms collude, is there an incentive for either to cheat on the collusion agreement? Explain. B. In general, why do firms tend not to engage in price war? High price Low price
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