Sean is arguing with his girlfriend, Yvette. They have been going out for a little more than two years.YVETTE: I'm leaving you, Sean. Get over it.SEAN: Are you saying that being single will make you happier than you've been with me? Speaking personally, I think theutilitywe've had in this relationship was much more than you could have had if you'd been single this whole time!YVETTE: I had taken an economics class and the word "utility" rings a bell. It's not that at all. We've had a fine time. It's that theutility I would get by continuing our relationship isn't worth it anymore.SEAN: I've never been dumped by someone citing the law ofbefore. You're a piece of work, you know that?Yvette doesn't hear. She has already walked off, leaving Sean feeling like something of a sunk cost.

Answered: Image /qna-images/answer/a1fb8962-2cce-4b5a-a4fb-f36964d4dfcc.jpg

Answered: YVETTE: I'm leaving you, Sean. Get over…

Economics (MindTap Course List)

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617383

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter20: Consumer Choice: Maximizing Utility And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8QP

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Suppose you have $35,000 in wealth. You have the opportunity to play a game called "Big Bet/Small Bet." In this game, you first choose whether you would like to make a big bet of $15,000 of a small bet of $5,000. You then roll a fair die. If you roll a 4, 5, or 6, you win the game and earn $15,000 for the big bet or $5,000 for the small bet. If you roll a 1, 2, or 3, you lose and lose $15,000 for the big bet and $5,000 for the small bet the game Utility U₂ U₁ BEL 0 11 LATE EE ARTE Are the Small Bet and Big Bet considered fair bets? O Big Bet is fair, but Small Bet is not. No, both are not fair. Yes, both are fair. 20 OSmall Bet is fair, but Big Bet is not. G HA 1 35 D E 1 1 1 1 1 F 1 U 50 Income (thousands of dollars)
Exercise 6.1Suppose that two airlines decide to collude. Analyse the game between these two companies. Suppose that each of them can charge for tickets a high price or a low price. If one of them charges 100 euros, it gets few profits if the other also charges 100 euros and high profits if the other charges 200 euros. On the other hand, if the company charges 200 euros, it obtains very little profit if the other charges 100 euros and an average profit if the other also charges 200 euros. a) Represent the matrix of results of this game. b) What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? Explain your answer. c) Is there an outcome that would be better than the Nash equilibrium for the two airlines? How could it be achieved? Who would lose out if it were reached?
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You have been assigned to create a new TV game show, and you have an interesting idea that you call, “I WANT TO BE A MILLIONAIRE.” The basics are: 1) two contestants; 2) the show begins with each contestant being given $1 million (!); and then 3) they begin playing a game that can increase or decrease that $1 million. You worry that the initial outlay of $2 million will stun your producers, so you decide to prepare them with a simpler version of your game that you call: “I WANT $3.” There are four steps in this simpler game: There are two contestants/opponents (who do not know each other and cannot communicate with each other during the game). Each player is given $3 at the start of the game. Independently and simultaneously, each player must choose whether they want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to their initial stake of $3. Doing so reduces their opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. Each player knows that their payoff at the end of the game is based on their initial $3,…
You and your roomate are deciding whether to go to a party or not on Friday. Going to the party is fun and gives a benefit of 4. If you go to the party, there is a 50% chance you will get covid. If you do not attend the party but your roommate does and gets covid, there is 80% chance that you will get covid. The impact of getting covid is -10. If both of you stay home, you will not be exposed to covid and will not have fun, leading to a payoff of 0 for both of you. 3. Construct a game matrix based on the description above and find any (c) Nash equilibria. How would your answer change if one roomate was less social and enjoyed (d) partying less than the other? Change the payoff matrix in a way that is both consistent with one roommate being less social than the other and changes the prediction you found in (a). (Note: if you found multiple possible equilibria in (a), changing the outcome could mean either making one of your prior Nash equilbria the only Nash equilibrium or making an…
You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…
which is the right answer
6. Eventually, Aron and Nora who we met in the previous problem were able to get together and have now been an item for some time. So long, in fact, that there are issues. Aron is a little insecure, which makes him jealous. Nora is none too pleased about it. When she arranges a girls' night out with some of her friends, Aron is very upset and threatens to break up. So Nora has to decide to go out with her friends or stay home with Aron. If she stays home, she gets a payoff of 0, whereas Aron gets what he wants and a payoff of 2 (perhaps he should be a little more concerned with Nora's happiness). On the other hand, if Nora decides to go out, then Aron must make a choice between breaking up or not. If he breaks up, both he and Nora are miserable and each receives a payoff of -1. If he does not, he gets a payoff of 1 while Nora gets what she wants and a payoff of 2. a) Draw the extensive form of this game. b) Find all Nash equilibria. Explain your answer carefully. c) Find the backward…
You are considering two options for your next family vacation. You can visit Disney World or Chicago. Your utility from Disney World is 100 if the weather is clear, and 0 if it rains. Chicago is worth a utility of 70 if the weather is clear and a utility of 40 if the weather is rainy. Also assume that the chance of rain at Disney World is going to be 50% and the chance of rain in Chicago is 40%. As a utility maximizer, should you plan to go to Disney World or Chicago? (Explain using relevant equations)
Both answer me
You are trying to decide between rescuing a puppy or an older dog. You decide to try to assign some numbers to your preferences so you can compare options. You estimate that your utility for a dog that will chew your furniture is 0.1 and your utility for a dog that can go on hikes with you is 0.8. You expect that a puppy will have an 70% chance of chewing your belongings and a 90% chance of going on hikes. What is your expected utility for getting the puppy?

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