What happens in the basic job search model if the uncertainty concerning the wage offer is switched off, i.e. there will only be one possible wage offer w0 (Hint: Similar as in the basic Diamond model) ? Answer this with respect to the job offer acceptance probability, the probability of moving to work and the unemployment duration? (Labour Economics)

What happens in the basic job search model if the uncertainty concerning the wage offer is switched off, i.e. there will only be one possible wage offer w0 (Hint: Similar as in the basic Diamond model) ? Answer this with respect to the job offer acceptance probability, the probability of moving to work and the unemployment duration? (Labour Economics)

Economics:

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285859460

Author:BOYES, William

Publisher:BOYES, William

Chapter15: Macroeconomic Viewpoints: New Keynesian, Monetarist, And New Classical

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 12E

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Need help ASAP, will give thumbs up: Consider an empirical wage equation of the form: log(W) = a + b(EDUC) + c(EXP) + d(EXPSQ) + u where the components are defined as: W = hourly wage rate log() is natural logarithmic function EDUC = completed years of school EXP = work experience EXPSQ = years of work experience squared (i.e. EXP times EXP) u = unobservable determinants of the hourly wage rate With data on the relevant variables for a sample of workers, the parameters a, b, c, and d can be estimated. QUESTION: What does human capital theory predict about the parameters of this wage equation? ANSWER CHOICES: b>0, c>0, d>0 b>0, c>0, d<0 b>0, c<0, d>0 b<0, c>0, d<0 b<0, c<0, d>0 Answer
Define the contingent worker?
The below graph shows the optimal asking wage. Suppose another individual with the same wage opportunities is more “future-oriented”. Adjust the graph to show the impact this will have on the asking wage and the length of his job search:
in the McCall partial equilibrium model, if unemployed individual can only live for 10 periods. In each period, she will receive $400 if unemployed. The offered wage is uniformly distributed in the range of [500,1000] 1.what will the reservation wage be in the period 9 if the discount rate is 0.9? 2.what will the reservation wage be in the period 8 if the discount rate is 0.9?
Follow-up questions. d. Let D be the difference in marginal product between an experienced worker and a new worker (MPe − MPn). Suppose that robust, experienced workers would prefer not to pool with sickly workers at their firm, and so they seek out a new job with an employer who does not offer health insurance. What will be the wage of the robust worker at the new job during the first year there? Keep in mind, these workers will no longer be experienced because they will be adapting to a new firm. Under what conditions will it make financial sense for the robust worker to change jobs? Your answer should be an inequality that includes D, θ, Vr, and Vs. e. D is a measure of job-specific human capital; as workers learn the job, they become more productive so D > 0. However, not every job or industry has the same value for D. In some lines of work D is low, while in others D is high, simply because of the nature of the work. Given the results, you have seen in this problem, in which…
Select the best answer from the drop down menus. Consider the lifecycle model of labour supply with multiple periods. Assume that the utility function in each period is the same thus preferences for leisure and consumption are constant over time. Individuals aim to maximise lifetime utility and are able to save and borrow. If individuals know that the wage in period 1 (w1) will be lower than the wage in period 2 (w2), we expect that they will work [Select] period 1 compared to period 2. This behaviour is called [Select] . Consumption is expected to be hours in [Select] If individuals instead behave as if in a static labour supply model(*), faced with the different wages in period 1 and 2 (w1
How does skill atrophy provide an explanation for differentiation in earnings?
Consider the job search behavior of an unemployed worker. There is a wage offer distribution, which is known to the unemployed worker. The unemployed worker draws one wage offer from that distribution each period and decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If she accepts, she is employed forever at that wage. If she rejects, she receives a fixed amount of unemployment insurance and draws another offer next period. Characterize and explain how the asking (or reservation) wage is determined. [Hint: Use a diagram and plot marginal cost of search versus the marginal revenue from search.] THE ANSWER SHOULD BE VERY CLEAR AND DETAİLED, THANK YOU!!!
In a tradeoff between two decision criteria such as ease of commuting and attractiveness of job, can you use money as a common denominator to estimate precise tradeoffs? State your reasons. Illustrate using the following tradeoff matrix. What sort of salary differences would it take for commute time to trump job attractiveness?Decision Criteria Monetary Issues Other IssuesCommute Time Medium MediumJob Attractiveness High Medium
To which of the following job characteristics could the hedonic wage function be applied? a. the degree to which a job involves monotonous work b. the degree to which the area surrounding the job location is safe c. the degree to which a job involves strenuous work d. the probability of being injured on the job e. All of these can be represented with a hedonic wage function.
Show that the competitive labor market compensates workers for the probability that they will be laid off.
In the no-shirking model, the expected payoff of the worker who shirks is (1 t)w + tjB + t(1 − j)(w – u) Explain what each of the following component in the formula represents: (1-t) is... w is... t is ... jis.. B is... (1-j) is... (w - u) is... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... the probability of finding another identical job if fired. the probability that shirking is not detected by the employer. the payoff of a worker who shirks and is not detected. ♦ ◆ ♦ ◆ the value of a job in equilibrium. the probability of remaining unemployed if fired. the unemployment benefit. the probability that a shirking worker is detected by the employer and fired.