Two firms sell differentiated products and compete in quantities. Inverse demand for the product of firm 1 is P₁ = 100 - Q₁-Q2, with Q₁ the quantity of firm 1, Q₂ the quantity of firm 2, and P₁ is the price that firm 1 receives for its product. Similarly, inverse demand for firm 2 is P₂ = 100 - Q₂-Q₁. Marginal costs for both firms are constant and equal to 40. There are no other Derive the Cournot equilibrium in terms of equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits. costs. i.

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ChapterB: Differential Calculus Techniques In Management
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Question 2
Two firms sell differentiated products and compete in quantities. Inverse demand for the product
of firm 1 is P₁ = 100 - Q₁-Q2, with Q₁ the quantity of firm 1, Q₂ the quantity of firm 2,
and P₁ is the price that firm 1 receives for its product. Similarly, inverse demand for firm 2 is P₂
100 - Q₂-Q₁. Marginal costs for both firms are constant and equal to 40. There are no other
=
costs.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Derive the Cournot equilibrium in terms of equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits.
Derive the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits.
Suppose firm one is the Stackelberg leader in a sequential game, find the equilibrium
output, profit and price.
Explain strategic complements and strategic substitutes using relevant diagrams.
Transcribed Image Text:Question 2 Two firms sell differentiated products and compete in quantities. Inverse demand for the product of firm 1 is P₁ = 100 - Q₁-Q2, with Q₁ the quantity of firm 1, Q₂ the quantity of firm 2, and P₁ is the price that firm 1 receives for its product. Similarly, inverse demand for firm 2 is P₂ 100 - Q₂-Q₁. Marginal costs for both firms are constant and equal to 40. There are no other = costs. i. ii. iii. iv. Derive the Cournot equilibrium in terms of equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits. Derive the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits. Suppose firm one is the Stackelberg leader in a sequential game, find the equilibrium output, profit and price. Explain strategic complements and strategic substitutes using relevant diagrams.
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