Suppose there are only two polluting firms, called A and B, with the following marginal abatement costs: MACA=160 2- e and MACB=100-es, where e represents firm A's emissions in tons and ea represents firm B's emissions in tons. Suppose the government wishes to ensure that the two firms together emit 60 tons of the pollutant and uses a Tradable Emission Permit (TEP) policy. Assume that each TEP allows its holder to emit 1 ton, and that the market for permits is perfectly competitive. a. Suppose the government initially distributes the total number of TEPs it issues equally between the two firms. The permits are distributed free of charge. Once trade in permits takes place, what will be the equilibrium in the market for TEPS (i.e. which firm will buy how many TEPs from the other, and at what price)? b. Briefly describe three problems of setting up a TEP market.

Micro Economics For Today
10th Edition
ISBN:9781337613064
Author:Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.
Chapter14: Environmental Economics
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 17SQ
icon
Related questions
Question
Suppose there are only two polluting firms, called A and B, with the following marginal
abatement costs: MACA=160 2- e and MACB=100-es, where e represents firm A's
emissions in tons and ea represents firm B's emissions in tons. Suppose the government
wishes to ensure that the two firms together emit 60 tons of the pollutant and uses a
Tradable Emission Permit (TEP) policy. Assume that each TEP allows its holder to emit 1
ton, and that the market for permits is perfectly competitive.
a. Suppose the government initially distributes the total number of TEPs it issues
equally between the two firms. The permits are distributed free of charge. Once
trade in permits takes place, what will be the equilibrium in the market for TEPS
(i.e. which firm will buy how many TEPs from the other, and at what price)?
b. Briefly describe three problems of setting up a TEP market.
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose there are only two polluting firms, called A and B, with the following marginal abatement costs: MACA=160 2- e and MACB=100-es, where e represents firm A's emissions in tons and ea represents firm B's emissions in tons. Suppose the government wishes to ensure that the two firms together emit 60 tons of the pollutant and uses a Tradable Emission Permit (TEP) policy. Assume that each TEP allows its holder to emit 1 ton, and that the market for permits is perfectly competitive. a. Suppose the government initially distributes the total number of TEPs it issues equally between the two firms. The permits are distributed free of charge. Once trade in permits takes place, what will be the equilibrium in the market for TEPS (i.e. which firm will buy how many TEPs from the other, and at what price)? b. Briefly describe three problems of setting up a TEP market.
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps with 9 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Environmental Protection Agency
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Micro Economics For Today
Micro Economics For Today
Economics
ISBN:
9781337613064
Author:
Tucker, Irvin B.
Publisher:
Cengage,
Economics For Today
Economics For Today
Economics
ISBN:
9781337613040
Author:
Tucker
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Exploring Economics
Exploring Economics
Economics
ISBN:
9781544336329
Author:
Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:
SAGE Publications, Inc
Principles of Economics 2e
Principles of Economics 2e
Economics
ISBN:
9781947172364
Author:
Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro
Publisher:
OpenStax
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage
Economics:
Economics:
Economics
ISBN:
9781285859460
Author:
BOYES, William
Publisher:
Cengage Learning