Background InformationThe Treaty of Versailles stated that although the Rhineland remained part of Germany, no Germantroops or any German fortifications were to be allowed there. Since coming to power in 1933, Hitlerhad been determined to reverse this situation.In 1935 France and the USSR signed a treaty of mutual support. Hitler claimed this treaty was hostileto Germany and hastened the development of secret plans for remilitarising the Rhineland. In 1936Britain developed plans to offer Germany remilitarisation in exchange for arms limitations. However,on 7 March German troops marched into the Rhineland.There has been much disagreement about why Hitler was able to get away with this. Was it becausehe knew that Britain was sympathetic and would do nothing to stop him?SOURCE AUsing as his excuse the French-Soviet Pact, Hitler sent a token force of 22 000 troops into theRhineland. As they marched the inhabitants of German cities were at first stupefied and thenjubilant. Laughing girls showered the soldiers with flowers. Many Rhinelanders expected the Frenchto retaliate and the German Defence Minister was ashen-faced with anxiety. Hitler offered a 25-yearnon-aggression pact with France but that evening 15000 stormtroopers paraded in Berlin singing'For today we own Germany and tomorrow the entire world'.This was exactly what the French feared. The French Prime Minister broadcast a reply. If acts like thiswere permitted, he said, there could be no peace; France would neither negotiate under menacenor let 'Strasbourg once again come again under the fire of German guns'. However, at this timeconcession was almost inevitable. Germany's occupation of the Rhineland was one of the mostheavily telegraphed moves in Europe since 1918, yet French governments had made no plans toreact and the government at the time was surprised. The French army was organised for defenceand did not possess a single unit ready for combat.Most of the government ministers were equally passive and France's British ally could not accept therisk of war. However, what ultimately paralysed France was the state of public opinion. The vast bulkof the population were revolted at the prospect of another war. This was the most frequentcomment heard on the streets of Paris, and seen in newspapers that the French rushed out to buy.'Above all, no war,' announced 'L'Action Française'.SOURCE BFrom a history book published in 2000.SOURCE DI can tell you that for five days and five nights not one of us closed an eye. We knew that if theFrench marched, we were done. We had no fortifications, and no army to match the French. If theFrench had even mobilised, we should have been compelled to retire. Many army officersconsidered Hitler's action suicidal.During February the British were considering the dangerous question of the demilitarised zone,though no immediate German move was expected. As it became clear that Hitler would soon grabhis prize, the British government began to think about using the Rhineland as a bargaining chip. TheBritish government would abandon its commitments with regard to the Rhineland, in an agreementwith Germany negotiated behind France's back.There does not seem to have been any real anxiety in the German High Command about thesituation, despite Hitler's momentary loss of nerve on 5 March. The successful military coup wasaccompanied by a peace offer intended to emphasise the peaceful nature of the Rhinelandoccupation.Hitler achieved the full measure of surprise that he intended when the invasion took place on7March. 22000 German soldiers entered the demilitarised zone. They were joined by paramilitaryforces numbering some 14 000 who had been infiltrated earlier.The French Prime Minister, in a broadcast to the French people, asserted that Strasbourg would notbe left under German guns. His resolute words fell flat. The reaction of French newspapers wasremarkably calm, reflecting the mood of most of the French public.The French government agreed that France would not engage in isolated action but there weredifferences between France and Britain about the best policy to follow. In the belief that the Frenchwanted firm action, the British government favoured quick condemnation of the German move andthe early opening of talks (that is, strong words but no retaliation). When the French appealed to theLeague, Goebbels wrote in his diary on 7 March, 'France will involve the League. Fine! It will not act.Nothing else matters.' It soon became clear that there would be little pressure from Leaguemembers for retribution. There was no promise of any participation in collective action. Hitler hadevery reason for confidence. Nor did the response of the League's members suggest that he wouldbe challenged in the future.From a history book published in 2011.SOURCE CMUTUALBackRUSSELRUSSIAA German officer who worked at the time in armyheadquarters speaking about the German marchinto the Rhineland. He was speaking during theSpanish Civil War.Ring-Around-the-Nazi !ASSISTANCEPACTFRANCEAn American cartoon published in March 1936 SOURCE EWe had discovered that our policy of condemning the German action and then developing aconstructive policy to re-establish the European situation had no chance of acceptance with France,Belgium or Italy. It was inevitable that the French and Belgians would both announce their intention- to ask the Council of the League to make a pronouncement. Then, if Germany was still obdurate,they would proceed to military measures and ask us to do the same. In that case, we should have todecide whether we intend to fulfil our Treaty obligation - and we should be in an impossible positionif we refused.The Prime Minister thought it would be necessary to point out to the French that the action theyproposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in Europe. They might succeed incrushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany goingCommunist.Our position at home and in home waters is a disadvantageous one, whether from the point of viewof the navy, army or air force, or anti-aircraft defence. In addition, public opinion was stronglyopposed to any military action against the Germans in the demilitarised zone. In thesecircumstances, it was generally accepted that it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escapefrom military action.SOURCE FFrom a record of a meeting of the BritishGovernment shortly after German troops marchedinto the RhinelandThere is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threatof hostilities. The German government speak of their 'unchangeable longing for peace in Europe'and state a willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with France and Belgium.SOURCE GFrom a speech in the House of Commons byAnthony Eden shortly after German troopsmarched into the Rhineland. Eden was in charge ofBritish Foreign Policy.GERMANICAPAXErnant HoshypourTHE GOOSE-STEP"GOOSEY GOOSEY GANDER,WHITHER DOST THOU WANDER?""ONLY THROUGH THE RHINELAND-PRAY EXCUSE MY BLUNDER!"A British cartoon, March 1936. 'Pax Germanica'means 'German Peace'6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler gotaway with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources toexplain your answer.SOURCE H7A photograph of German troops riding into theRhineland on 7th March 1936

Question

Background InformationThe Treaty of Versailles stated that although the Rhineland remained part of Germany, no Germantroops or any German fortifications were to be allowed there. Since coming to power in 1933, Hitlerhad been determined to reverse this situation.In 1935 France and the USSR signed a treaty of mutual support. Hitler claimed this treaty was hostileto Germany and hastened the development of secret plans for remilitarising the Rhineland. In 1936Britain developed plans to offer Germany remilitarisation in exchange for arms limitations. However,on 7 March German troops marched into the Rhineland.There has been much disagreement about why Hitler was able to get away with this. Was it becausehe knew that Britain was sympathetic and would do nothing to stop him?SOURCE AUsing as his excuse the French-Soviet Pact, Hitler sent a token force of 22 000 troops into theRhineland. As they marched the inhabitants of German cities were at first stupefied and thenjubilant. Laughing girls showered the soldiers with flowers. Many Rhinelanders expected the Frenchto retaliate and the German Defence Minister was ashen-faced with anxiety. Hitler offered a 25-yearnon-aggression pact with France but that evening 15000 stormtroopers paraded in Berlin singing'For today we own Germany and tomorrow the entire world'.This was exactly what the French feared. The French Prime Minister broadcast a reply. If acts like thiswere permitted, he said, there could be no peace; France would neither negotiate under menacenor let 'Strasbourg once again come again under the fire of German guns'. However, at this timeconcession was almost inevitable. Germany's occupation of the Rhineland was one of the mostheavily telegraphed moves in Europe since 1918, yet French governments had made no plans toreact and the government at the time was surprised. The French army was organised for defenceand did not possess a single unit ready for combat.Most of the government ministers were equally passive and France's British ally could not accept therisk of war. However, what ultimately paralysed France was the state of public opinion. The vast bulkof the population were revolted at the prospect of another war. This was the most frequentcomment heard on the streets of Paris, and seen in newspapers that the French rushed out to buy.'Above all, no war,' announced 'L'Action Française'.SOURCE BFrom a history book published in 2000.SOURCE DI can tell you that for five days and five nights not one of us closed an eye. We knew that if theFrench marched, we were done. We had no fortifications, and no army to match the French. If theFrench had even mobilised, we should have been compelled to retire. Many army officersconsidered Hitler's action suicidal.During February the British were considering the dangerous question of the demilitarised zone,though no immediate German move was expected. As it became clear that Hitler would soon grabhis prize, the British government began to think about using the Rhineland as a bargaining chip. TheBritish government would abandon its commitments with regard to the Rhineland, in an agreementwith Germany negotiated behind France's back.There does not seem to have been any real anxiety in the German High Command about thesituation, despite Hitler's momentary loss of nerve on 5 March. The successful military coup wasaccompanied by a peace offer intended to emphasise the peaceful nature of the Rhinelandoccupation.Hitler achieved the full measure of surprise that he intended when the invasion took place on7March. 22000 German soldiers entered the demilitarised zone. They were joined by paramilitaryforces numbering some 14 000 who had been infiltrated earlier.The French Prime Minister, in a broadcast to the French people, asserted that Strasbourg would notbe left under German guns. His resolute words fell flat. The reaction of French newspapers wasremarkably calm, reflecting the mood of most of the French public.The French government agreed that France would not engage in isolated action but there weredifferences between France and Britain about the best policy to follow. In the belief that the Frenchwanted firm action, the British government favoured quick condemnation of the German move andthe early opening of talks (that is, strong words but no retaliation). When the French appealed to theLeague, Goebbels wrote in his diary on 7 March, 'France will involve the League. Fine! It will not act.Nothing else matters.' It soon became clear that there would be little pressure from Leaguemembers for retribution. There was no promise of any participation in collective action. Hitler hadevery reason for confidence. Nor did the response of the League's members suggest that he wouldbe challenged in the future.From a history book published in 2011.SOURCE CMUTUALBackRUSSELRUSSIAA German officer who worked at the time in armyheadquarters speaking about the German marchinto the Rhineland. He was speaking during theSpanish Civil War.Ring-Around-the-Nazi !ASSISTANCEPACTFRANCEAn American cartoon published in March 1936 SOURCE EWe had discovered that our policy of condemning the German action and then developing aconstructive policy to re-establish the European situation had no chance of acceptance with France,Belgium or Italy. It was inevitable that the French and Belgians would both announce their intention- to ask the Council of the League to make a pronouncement. Then, if Germany was still obdurate,they would proceed to military measures and ask us to do the same. In that case, we should have todecide whether we intend to fulfil our Treaty obligation - and we should be in an impossible positionif we refused.The Prime Minister thought it would be necessary to point out to the French that the action theyproposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in Europe. They might succeed incrushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany goingCommunist.Our position at home and in home waters is a disadvantageous one, whether from the point of viewof the navy, army or air force, or anti-aircraft defence. In addition, public opinion was stronglyopposed to any military action against the Germans in the demilitarised zone. In thesecircumstances, it was generally accepted that it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escapefrom military action.SOURCE FFrom a record of a meeting of the BritishGovernment shortly after German troops marchedinto the RhinelandThere is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threatof hostilities. The German government speak of their 'unchangeable longing for peace in Europe'and state a willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with France and Belgium.SOURCE GFrom a speech in the House of Commons byAnthony Eden shortly after German troopsmarched into the Rhineland. Eden was in charge ofBritish Foreign Policy.GERMANICAPAXErnant HoshypourTHE GOOSE-STEP&#34;GOOSEY GOOSEY GANDER,WHITHER DOST THOU WANDER?&#34;&#34;ONLY THROUGH THE RHINELAND-PRAY EXCUSE MY BLUNDER!&#34;A British cartoon, March 1936. 'Pax Germanica'means 'German Peace'6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler gotaway with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources toexplain your answer.SOURCE H7A photograph of German troops riding into theRhineland on 7th March 1936

Accepted Answer

Under the treaty of Versailles and Locarno, Germany was prohibited from militarizing the Rhineland…

6. Study all the sources. How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Hitler got away with the remilitarisation of the Rhineland because Britain did nothing? Use the sources to explain your answer.