15. A total of 10 players are each choosing a number from {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8).If a player's number equals exactly half of the average of the numbers sub-mitted by the other nine players, then she is paid $100; otherwise, she ispaid 0. Solve for the strategies that survive the IDSDS.

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Answered: of 10 players are each choosing a…

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3MC

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6. Two players each pick a positive integer between 1 and 100. If the numbers are identical, noone wins. If the numbers differ by 1, the one with the lower number pays 1 to the opponent. If the difference is at least 2, the one with the higher number pays 2 to the opponent. What is the NE? Hint: Draw a sketch of the game matrix (while you can't consider all 100 strategies, at least consider the lowest 5-6 numbers) and think about dominated strategies.
GAME ZZZ B1 Player B A1 30, 30 Player A A2 20, 40 B2 40, 20 35, 35 In the Game ZZZ (see table above), all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second. In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. the Nash equilibrium does not maximize the total payoff. there is no Nash equilibrium. the Nash equilibrium maximizes the total payoff.
Each of 3 companies are considering entry into a new market. The cost of entry is 30. If only one company enters, then its gross profit is 200. If more than one company enters, then each entrant earns a gross profit of 40. The payoff to a company that enters is its gross profit minus its entry cost, while the payoff to a company that does not enter is 60. This implies that if all companies enter the market their payoffs are 10 while if all of them stays out their payoffs are 60. If only one company enters the market its payoff is 170 (while the other two companies’ payoffs are 60). If two companies enter the market their payoffs are 10. Problem Set 2 Due Sunday October 3rd You can discuss the problem set with your classmates, but you are required to submit your independent answers. a) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game. b) Can you find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium such that exactly one company plays mixed strategy? If yes, what is it? c) Can you find a mixed…
Determine the optimum strategies and the value of the game with the followingpayoff matrix of player A where A1, A2 are the strategies for player A and B1, B2 are for player B.B1 B2A1 5 1A2 3 4
Consider the following representation of a Normal form game. actions w a (45,22) (10,38) (42,13) (10,7) (p,28) (15,40) (q,10) (44,10) (20,22) (14,31) (27,13) (12,8) d. (20,41) (9,48) (28,24) (18,32) Here each cell in the table represents an ordered pair. First element is payoff of the first player and second element is payoff of the second player. The letters a, b, c, d, x, y, z, w represent the actions. Write down the table in your answer script too. Now answer the following questions: 1. What is the distinction between strictly dominant strategy and weakly dominant strategy? Is it reasonable for a player to play a strictly dominated strategy? Explain why. 2. What are the minimum values for p and q that will make ba strategy that strictly dominates all other strategies for player 1, assuming both p and q are natural numbers? 3. Does player 2 have any strictly dominated pure strategy? If yes, which pure strategy dominates that strategy? If the submit button is off it is beacuse the due…
Consider the following game: Player 1 T M B N R (1,2) (1,1) (3,4) (1,-1) L Player 2 (-1,2) (2, -1) (0,1) (4,4) S (3,2) (4,5) (5,4)) (6,1) Q (1,5) (1,2) (4,1) (1,4) a) Does player 1 (the row player) have any dominated strategies. If yes, list all such strategies b) Find all the Pareto Optimal strategy profiles in the game. c) Let 0= (1/2, 0,1/4,1/4). Find BR₂(0).
A total of 10 players are each choosing a number from {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}. If a player's number equals exactly half of the average of the numbers submitted by the other nine players, then she is paid $100; otherwise, she is paid 0. Solve for the strategies that survive the IDSDS.
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of 10 players are each choosing a number from {0,1 ver's number equals exactly half of the average of the by the other nine players, then she is paid $100; oth Solve for the strategies that survive the IDSDS.