Now suppose you do go pro: 4. Write down the dynamic budget constraint 5. Derive the intertemporal budget constraint 6. Using the same graph as in part 3, draw the new budget constraint and the new optimal consumption point. 7. Should you go pro? Under what conditions is it better to go pro? Explain.

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Chapter17: Capital And Time
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Problem 3 - Should I go pro?
Suppose you are considering becoming a professional athlete. Whilst a pro athlete can expect to make a lot of
money when they're young, they may struggle to find gainful employment later in life. If you decide against going
pro, you can expect a much steadier income, though perhaps not quite as lucrative at 21. Which will you choose?
Let's set this up formally.
.
Suppose that you live for two periods, t =1,2.
If you go pro, in t=1, you will earn Y₁P, which is more than what you would earn in t=1 if you do not go
pro, Y₁P. In other words, Y₁P>Y₁np.
2.
However, in period t=2, as a pro you will earn zero: Y₂P=0. By contrast, Y₂¹P >0.
Being a pro athlete makes you a prominent public figure. In period t=1, you have to pay security guards a
fixed amount S to keep you safe from the mob of fans who stalk your every move on social media.
Once your professional career is over, you are quickly forgotten, so you don't have to spend anything on
security in t=2.
Non-pros have no such problems; they do not pay S in t=1 or t=2.
You have well-behaved preferences (you like more consumption, and you have decreasing marginal utility
in consumption in both periods)
You can borrow and lend at the rate r against an amount of assets, a.
You are selfish! No bequeathments from past generations, and you pass on nothing.
First suppose that you do not go pro:
1. Write down the dynamic budget constraint
Derive the intertemporal budget constraint
3. Show graphically the budget constraint and the optimal consumption point in period 1 and 2. Make the
diagram large enough for subsequent question parts.
Now suppose you do go pro:
4. Write down the dynamic budget constraint
5. Derive the intertemporal budget constraint
6. Using the same graph as in part 3, draw the new budget constraint and the new optimal consumption point.
7. Should you go pro? Under what conditions is it better to go pro? Explain.
Suppose that the government feels sad for athletes and decides to subsidize retired athletes when they're old. This
can't be free! In order to pay athletes the subsidy G in period 2, the government taxes everyone the amount T'in
period 1. Note that you pay this whether you go pro or not. Furthermore, the government balances its budget such
that G=T.
8. Derive the new intertemporal budget constraints for the pro and non-pro cases in terms of r, C, Y, S, and T.
9.
Briefly and intuitively, are you more or less likely to go pro under this government policy, and why? If you
are an athlete, how much of your tax T will the government eventually 'return' to you?
Transcribed Image Text:Problem 3 - Should I go pro? Suppose you are considering becoming a professional athlete. Whilst a pro athlete can expect to make a lot of money when they're young, they may struggle to find gainful employment later in life. If you decide against going pro, you can expect a much steadier income, though perhaps not quite as lucrative at 21. Which will you choose? Let's set this up formally. . Suppose that you live for two periods, t =1,2. If you go pro, in t=1, you will earn Y₁P, which is more than what you would earn in t=1 if you do not go pro, Y₁P. In other words, Y₁P>Y₁np. 2. However, in period t=2, as a pro you will earn zero: Y₂P=0. By contrast, Y₂¹P >0. Being a pro athlete makes you a prominent public figure. In period t=1, you have to pay security guards a fixed amount S to keep you safe from the mob of fans who stalk your every move on social media. Once your professional career is over, you are quickly forgotten, so you don't have to spend anything on security in t=2. Non-pros have no such problems; they do not pay S in t=1 or t=2. You have well-behaved preferences (you like more consumption, and you have decreasing marginal utility in consumption in both periods) You can borrow and lend at the rate r against an amount of assets, a. You are selfish! No bequeathments from past generations, and you pass on nothing. First suppose that you do not go pro: 1. Write down the dynamic budget constraint Derive the intertemporal budget constraint 3. Show graphically the budget constraint and the optimal consumption point in period 1 and 2. Make the diagram large enough for subsequent question parts. Now suppose you do go pro: 4. Write down the dynamic budget constraint 5. Derive the intertemporal budget constraint 6. Using the same graph as in part 3, draw the new budget constraint and the new optimal consumption point. 7. Should you go pro? Under what conditions is it better to go pro? Explain. Suppose that the government feels sad for athletes and decides to subsidize retired athletes when they're old. This can't be free! In order to pay athletes the subsidy G in period 2, the government taxes everyone the amount T'in period 1. Note that you pay this whether you go pro or not. Furthermore, the government balances its budget such that G=T. 8. Derive the new intertemporal budget constraints for the pro and non-pro cases in terms of r, C, Y, S, and T. 9. Briefly and intuitively, are you more or less likely to go pro under this government policy, and why? If you are an athlete, how much of your tax T will the government eventually 'return' to you?
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