QUESTION 14Note: No referencing is required for short answer questions.The following market is a duopoly populated only by the companies Alphe and Beta. The pay-off matric immediately below shows the combinations of pricing strategies availableAssuming Beta has a first mover advantage in a one-shot game, what is lieky to be the Nash equilibrium? Explain your answerAlphaHigh priceLow priceHigh price250, 200Beta200, 100Low price50, 150100, 250The numbers represent millions of cin profe (The r

Oligopoly is a form of market where there is only a limited number of firms or suppliers who have a…

Note: No referencing is required for short answer questions The following market is a duopoly populated only by the companies Aighe and Bea. The p Assuming Beta has a first mover advantage in a one-shot game what is wity to t the Nash equilibrium? Explain your an Alpha High price Low price Beta High price 250, 200 200, 100 Low price 50, 150 100, 250

Note: No referencing is required for short answer questions The following market is a duopoly populated only by the companies Aighe and Bea. The p Assuming Beta has a first mover advantage in a one-shot game what is wity to t the Nash equilibrium? Explain your an Alpha High price Low price Beta High price 250, 200 200, 100 Low price 50, 150 100, 250

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Film A) is large and the other film (Film B) is small, as the prisoners dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. Assuming that both films know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?
Does each individual in a prisoners dilemma benefit more from cooperation or from pursuing self-interest? Explain briefly.
Consider the following price game: Firm 1 Firm 2 High Low High 20, 20 12, 24 Low 24, 12 14, 14 Remark: In simultaneous move games (games with rows and columns) theconvention is to write the row player’s payoff first and the column player’spayoff second. (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Recall that for each playeryou should find the best response to each of the opponents’ strategies andunderline the associated payoff. Then look for a cell where both strategiesare best responses to each other. This is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)?
◄ Search 12:47 PM Sun Nov 12 ← Note Nov 12, 2023 Uptown's price strategy The Nash equilibrium occurs when High Low LED RareAir's price strategy High $12 $15 The more favorable outcome would be for $12 Tt ✪ $6 B Low $6 D $8. $15 $8 S O both firms have an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the dominant strategy of cell A. 92% neither firm has an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the dominant strategy of cell D. O one firm consistently has an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the high-price strategy of cell B. O one firm consistently has an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the high-price strategy of cell C. O the firms to collude and use the high-price strategy but this strategy requires cooperation. O one firm to take the lead and let the…
1. For the following game Player B Player A Left 7,17 10,5 4,4 Middle Right 14,11 4,3 10,25 21,21 Тop Middle 14,4 Bottom 7,3 a) Determine the Nash equilibrium is any? b) Represent the game sequentially starting with player 1 and determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium c) Represent the game sequentially starting with player 2 and determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium d) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the following game e) Firm 1 Firm 2 High price Low price High price 4,3 2,4 Low price 2,4 3,3
1. Find all subgame perfect nash equilibrium 2. Find a nash equilibrium that is not SPNE, and explain why it is not an SPNE.
6. Consider the simultaneous move pricing game below. Which of the following statements is true concerning this game? a. The game has a dominant strategy (DSSC) solution b. The game has an iterated dominance (IESDS) solution c. The game has more than 1 Nash equilibrium d. None of the above statements are true Firm A Firm B H M L H 30,30 38,12 33,0 M 11,34 18,14 23,1 L 2,24 6,17 14,8
Solve for the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) in each of the following games. (a) The following two-by-two game is a little harder to solve since firm 2’spreferred strategy depends of what firm 1 does. But firm 1 has a dominantstrategy so this game has one Nash equilibrium. Firm 2 Launch Don’tFirm 1 Launch 60, -10 100, 0 Don’t 80, 30 120, 0 What is the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous-move game? (b) What would the outcome of this game be if instead firm 1 moved first and then, after seeing what firm 1 chose, firm 2 chose it strategy? In this case firm 1 doesn’t necessarily need to choose a best response, but firm 2 must choose a best response since it moves second.
4. Suppose in 1977 Honda and Toyota each have to decide whether to build an automobile plant in the North American market. The payoff matrix below shows Honda's payoff on the left, and Toyota's on the right. Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, where, and how do you know? Тoyota Build small Don't build anything plant Build small 16, 16 20, 15 Honda plant Don't build anything 15, 20 18, 18
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