10 citizens need to decide whether or not to revolt against their government. If at least6 (i.e., n ≥ 6) citizens revolt against the government, they will start a successful revolutionand overthrow the government. Otherwise (if n < 6), the government remains in power. Thecitizens' payoffs depend on whether they have chosen to revolt and whether the governmentis overthrown. Revolting is costly. Thus, if a citizen has chosen to revolt, their payoff isreduced by 5 regardless the outcome of the revolution. If the government is overthrown,each citizen receives payoff 10 regardless whether they have chosen to revolt or not, whereasif the government remains in power each citizen receives payoff 0. For example, if 8 citizensrevolt, each of them will receive net payoff 5 and the other 2 citizens will each receive payoff10. However, if 2 citizens revolt, each of them will receive net payoff -5 and the other 8citizens will receive payoff 0.(1) Is every citizen revolting a Nash equilibrium of the game? Explain.(2) Is every citizen not revolting a Nash equilibrium of the game? Explain.(3) Are there any other Nash equilibria? If there are, specify such a Nash equilibrium,and verify that it is a Nash equilibrium. If no other Nash equilibria exit, explain whythe other action profiles are not Nash equilibria.

Nash equilibrium is a major concept in game theory that represents a game condition in which no…

Is every citizen revolting a Nash equilibrium of the game? Explain. Is every citizen not revolting a Nash equilibrium of the game? Explain. Are there any other Nash equilibria? If there are, specify such a Nash equilibrium, and verify that it is a Nash equilibrium. If no other Nash equilibria exit, explain why the other action profiles are not Nash equilibria.

Is every citizen revolting a Nash equilibrium of the game? Explain. Is every citizen not revolting a Nash equilibrium of the game? Explain. Are there any other Nash equilibria? If there are, specify such a Nash equilibrium, and verify that it is a Nash equilibrium. If no other Nash equilibria exit, explain why the other action profiles are not Nash equilibria.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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