In the city of Swiftsure, there is only one crime, armed robbery. The city recently decided to double the probability of imprisonment from 10 percent (10 percent of armed robberies result in a prison sentence) to 20 percent. Because the city has a fixed prison capacity, it also cut the average prison sentence in half, from 3 years to 1.5 years. a. Would you expect these changes in the city’s crime policy to increase, decrease, or not affect the city’s crime rate? Explain why. Would you expect these changes to increase, decrease, or not affect the total cost of crime (the sum of victim and prevention costs)?

In the city of Swiftsure, there is only one crime, armed robbery. The city recently decided to double the probability of imprisonment from 10 percent (10 percent of armed robberies result in a prison sentence) to 20 percent. Because the city has a fixed prison capacity, it also cut the average prison sentence in half, from 3 years to 1.5 years. a. Would you expect these changes in the city’s crime policy to increase, decrease, or not affect the city’s crime rate? Explain why. Would you expect these changes to increase, decrease, or not affect the total cost of crime (the sum of victim and prevention costs)?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 21P: Jane and Bill are apprehended for a bank robbery. They are taken into separate rooms and questioned...

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In the city of Swiftsure, there is only one crime, armed robbery. The city recently decided to double the probability of imprisonment from 10 percent (10 percent of armed robberies result in a prison sentence) to 20 percent. Because the city has a fixed prison capacity, it also cut the average prison sentence in half, from 3 years to 1.5 years. a. Would you expect these changes in the city’s crime policy to increase, decrease, or not affect the city’s crime rate? Explain why. b. would you expect these changes to increase, decrease, or not affect the total cost of crime (the sum of victim and prevention costs.
Crime and Punishment Ben and Jerry are two partners-in-crime, who have robbed a bank. Ben got caught and is ques- tioned by the police. He has got three options: to stay silent, confess, or tell the police that it was Jerry. Jerry can either remain at home, go to the police and blame Ben, or kill Ben's dog and cat. Ben feels good about confessing if Jerry does not do anything against him and feels good going to the police otherwise. Jerry on the other hand would hate to kill Ben's dog and cat, but would indulge in the revenge if Ben went to the police. For Jerry it is bad if Ben goes to the police. Ben is on the left and Jerry is on top, and their payoffs are on the left/right. Jerry Home Silent 3/4 -4/5-5/3 Confess -2/5 -3/6 -7/-5 Police -3/-7 -1/-6 4/2 Find the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when 1. Ben and Jerry move at the same time, not knowing what the other does. 2. Ben moves first, then Jerry can observe this and subsequently makes his choice. 3. Jerry moves first, then…
If opportunity cost of going to prison for a person falls,this person is less likely to commit a criminal act true or false?
Question 4 Suppose a prosecutor expects to convict a defendant with probability 0.5 and that the sentence on conviction is 10 years in prison. Assume the prosecutor values prison time at $1,000 per year (its value as a deterrent of crime), and incurs a cost of trial equal to $2,000. a. What is the minimum prison sentence the prosecutor will o er as part of a plea bargain if her objective is to maximize the expected value of the sentence imposed, less the cost of trial (ignore the information provided in b. below to answer this question a.)? b. Suppose the defendant believes his chances of being convicted are 0.3, his cost of prison time is $5,000 per year, and his cost of a trial is $1,000. Will he accept the plea bargain in a.?
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Pirates of the Caribbean When Spain colonized the New World, they extracted untold riches from there to finance their wars in Europe. The gold and silver had to be transported back to Europe on ships and these were attractive targets for pirates and privateers from other countries. Imagine the fictional Capitano Juan Barcodoro, who is in Cartagena and has to bring his cargo safely back to Sevilla, but he knows that the ruthless French pirate François Dragon is lurking. He can sail one of two routes: following the coast to Trinidad or go for Santo Domingo on Hispaniola. The pirates have to decide where they try to intercept him. Barcodoro is on the left and François Dragon on top, and their payoffs are on the left/right. Juan François Trinidad Hispaniola 5/-2 Trinidad -8/6 Hispaniola 2/-3 -8/7 What is Barcodoro's best response if he believes the pirates are at Trinidad? What if he believes they are at Hispaniola? Also find the pirates' best responses. Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure…
Suppose that optimal deterrence of a particular crime requires setting the expected punishment equal to $2000. Assume that the probability of apprehension is fixed at .2 Suppose an offender has a wealth of $5000 and incurs a cost of 1000 per month spent in prison. What combination of a fine and prison term achieves optimal deterrence at the lowest cost? What combination of a fine and prison term is optimal for an offender with a wealth of $7000 (assuming the same monthly cost of imprisonment)? Suppose considerations of fairness dictate that the prison term of offenders who commit the same crime must be the same. What fine and prison term must be imposed on the two offenders to maintain optimal deterrence?
Question 19 2.5 points Save Answer Prisoner B Remain Silent Confess (do not (cooperate with other prisoner) A gets 2 years, B | A gets 8 years, B gets 2 years A gets 1 year, B gets 8 years cooperate with other prisoner) Remain Silent (cooperate with other prisoner) Confess (do not cooperate with other prisoner) gets 1 year A gets 5 years, B gets 5 years Prisoner A Two prisoners have the option of confessing or remaining silent. The results of their choices are interdependent. Both are trying to minimize their time served in prison. These are the potential outcomes. What is the Nash Equilibrium? Confess, Confess Confess, Remain Silent Remain Silent, Remain Silent Remain Silent, Confess O O
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Jane and Bill are apprehended for a bank robbery. They are taken into separate rooms and questioned by the police about their involvement in the crime. The police tell them each that if they confess and turn the other person in, they will receive a fighter sentence. If they both confess, they will be each be sentenced to 30 years. If neither confesses, they will each receive a 20-year sentence. If only one confesses, the they will receive 15 years and the one who stayed silent will receive 35 years. Table 10.7 below represents the choices available to Jane and Bill. If Jane trusts Bill to stay silent, what should she do? If Jane thinks that Bill will confess, what should she do? Does Jane have a dominant strategy? Does Bill have a dominant strategy? A = Confess; B = Stay Silent. (Each results entry lists Janes sentence first (in years), and Bills sentence second.)
20-4. Suppose that every driver faces a 1% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $10,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $60,000 in he bank those with $5,000 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in a accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank . What is the actuarily fair price insurance? What price individuals wit $5,000 in the bank willing to pay or the insurance? Will those with $5,000 in the bank voluntarily purchase insurance? What is the effect of state law forcing individuals to purchase auto liability insurance?