In an exchange economy, there are two people, A and B, and two goods,X1 and X2. Their respective utility functions and endowments are u (x, x ) = min (xf, 2x ) u (xf, x) = xf +x oA = (4,9), w = (4, 0). %3D %3D %3D %3D Note: The As and Bs in the equations above are not powers but rather superscripts to indicate each agent. The minimum and maximum possible amounts of Xx^2 on the contract curve are Minimum x %3D Maximum X %3D 0; 4 O 4; 8 O 4; 4

In an exchange economy, there are two people, A and B, and two goods,X1 and X2. Their respective utility functions and endowments are u (x, x ) = min (xf, 2x ) u (xf, x) = xf +x oA = (4,9), w = (4, 0). %3D %3D %3D %3D Note: The As and Bs in the equations above are not powers but rather superscripts to indicate each agent. The minimum and maximum possible amounts of Xx^2 on the contract curve are Minimum x %3D Maximum X %3D 0; 4 O 4; 8 O 4; 4

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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