Gary likes to gamble. Donna offers to bet him $31 on the outcome of a boat race. If Gary's boat wins, Donna would give him $31. If Gary's boat does not win, Gary would give her $31. Gary's utility function is p1x^21+p2x^22, where P₁ and p2 are the probabilities of events 1 and 2 and where x₁ and x2 are his wealth if events 1 and 2 occur respectively. Gary's total wealth is currently only $80 and he believes that the probability that he will win the race is 0.3. Which of the following is correct? (please submit the number corresponding to the correct answer). 1. Taking the bet would reduce his expected utility. 2. Taking the bet would leave his expected utility unchanged. 3. Taking the bet would increase his expected utility. 4. There is not enough information to determine whether taking the bet would increase or decrease his expected utility. 5. The information given in the problem is self-contradictory.

Gary likes to gamble. Donna offers to bet him $31 on the outcome of a boat race. If Gary's boat wins, Donna would give him $31. If Gary's boat does not win, Gary would give her $31. Gary's utility function is p1x^21+p2x^22, where P₁ and p2 are the probabilities of events 1 and 2 and where x₁ and x2 are his wealth if events 1 and 2 occur respectively. Gary's total wealth is currently only $80 and he believes that the probability that he will win the race is 0.3. Which of the following is correct? (please submit the number corresponding to the correct answer). 1. Taking the bet would reduce his expected utility. 2. Taking the bet would leave his expected utility unchanged. 3. Taking the bet would increase his expected utility. 4. There is not enough information to determine whether taking the bet would increase or decrease his expected utility. 5. The information given in the problem is self-contradictory.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.1P

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Gary likes to gamble. Donna offers to bet him $31 on the outcome of a boat race. If Gary’s boat wins, Donna would give him $31. If Gary’s boat does not win, Gary would give her $31. Gary’s utility function is p1x^21+p2x^22, where p1 and p2 are the probabilities of events 1 and 2 and where x1 and x2 are his wealth if events 1 and 2 occur respectively. Gary’s total wealth is currently only $80 and he believes that the probability that he will win the race is 0.3. Which of the following is correct? (please submit the number corresponding to the correct answer). Taking the bet would reduce his expected utility. Taking the bet would leave his expected utility unchanged. Taking the bet would increase his expected utility. There is not enough information to determine whether taking the bet would increase or decrease his expected utility. The information given in the problem is self-contradictory.
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