Economic development is a zero-sum game: if some people in market economies are able to get wealthy, they must be able to do so only if they are stealing from the rest of the population, and therefore the rest of the population must become poorer. Group of answer choices True False

Economic development is a zero-sum game: if some people in market economies are able to get wealthy, they must be able to do so only if they are stealing from the rest of the population, and therefore the rest of the population must become poorer. Group of answer choices True False

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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