Dizz Cut price Maintain price Perlis Cut price (-1,-1) A (2,-2) B Maintain price (-2,2) (1,1) D Figure 12 Payoff matrix for two firms in oligopoly Two firms, Perlis and Dizz, produce washing powder in a market characterised by oligopoly. Each firm can increase its market share and profits by cutting its price relative to its rival. However if both firms cut prices they both suffer a fall in profit. This situation may be characterised as a game and Figure 12 shows the payoff matrix for this game. Figure 12 also labels each cell in the payoff matrix with a letter, A, B, C or D. Based on the information in the payoff matrix, decide which cells, if any, correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Select one answer. Select one: O There is no Nash equilibrium O D O A O A and D

Dizz Cut price Maintain price Perlis Cut price (-1,-1) A (2,-2) B Maintain price (-2,2) (1,1) D Figure 12 Payoff matrix for two firms in oligopoly Two firms, Perlis and Dizz, produce washing powder in a market characterised by oligopoly. Each firm can increase its market share and profits by cutting its price relative to its rival. However if both firms cut prices they both suffer a fall in profit. This situation may be characterised as a game and Figure 12 shows the payoff matrix for this game. Figure 12 also labels each cell in the payoff matrix with a letter, A, B, C or D. Based on the information in the payoff matrix, decide which cells, if any, correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Select one answer. Select one: O There is no Nash equilibrium O D O A O A and D

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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