Question 16Consider the following Extended Form Game:A'(9,5)O {(A,B), (A', B')}AP2B' 'A'O {(B,B), (A', B')}P1(5,2) (8,5)BA(1,6)P2B'P1BWhat is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium?(6,7)O {(A,A), (A', A)),((A,B), (A', A')), ((A,A), (A', B')).((A,B), (A', B'))}O (((B,A), (A', A')).((B,B), (A', A')), ((B,A), (A', B')), ((B,B), (A', B'))} Question 17Consider the following Extended Form Game:0 50809A'01(9,5)AP2P1B' A'(5,2) (8,5)BA(1,6)P2B'What payoff does player 1 derives if player 1 chooses the strategy (B,A) and player 2 chooses thestrategy (A, B')?P1B(6,7)

To determine the Nash equilibria which is subgame perfect, we will use the extensive form…

Consider the following Extended Form Game: A' (9,5) O {(A,B), (A', B')} A P2 P1 O ((B,B), (A', B')} B' 'A' (5,2) (8,5) B A (1,6) P2 B' P1 B What is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium? (6,7) O (((A,A), (A', A')),((A,B), (A¹, A')), ((A,A), (A', B')).((A,B), (A', B'))} O (((B.A), (A', A')).((B,B), (A', A')), ((B,A), (A', B')).((B,B), (A', B'))}

Consider the following Extended Form Game: A' (9,5) O {(A,B), (A', B')} A P2 P1 O ((B,B), (A', B')} B' 'A' (5,2) (8,5) B A (1,6) P2 B' P1 B What is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium? (6,7) O (((A,A), (A', A')),((A,B), (A¹, A')), ((A,A), (A', B')).((A,B), (A', B'))} O (((B.A), (A', A')).((B,B), (A', A')), ((B,A), (A', B')).((B,B), (A', B'))}

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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