Assuming two players in the market, with the assumption that each control half of the market initially with their main target being output maximization, Suppose Q=90-P, with necessary illustrations, (a) Determine market Equilibrium under oligopol- (b) Given the functions, P= 100-0.5(X1+X2) and cost function described by Cl = 5X1 and C2 = 0.5X², (i) Find the profit made by each firm if equilibrium under oligopoly is achieved (ii) Calculate the MR of each firm at equilibrium © With necessary illustrations, describe the conventional conditions for profit maximization for any typical profit firm (c) Consider a typical profit a firm that sells product X whos selling price is P= 100 – 2Q, with cost function of C= 50+ 0.5Q. Using 1* order condition, (i) determine the profit maximizing Q (ii) what would be the profit maximizing Revenue?

Assuming two players in the market, with the assumption that each control half of the market initially with their main target being output maximization, Suppose Q=90-P, with necessary illustrations, (a) Determine market Equilibrium under oligopol- (b) Given the functions, P= 100-0.5(X1+X2) and cost function described by Cl = 5X1 and C2 = 0.5X², (i) Find the profit made by each firm if equilibrium under oligopoly is achieved (ii) Calculate the MR of each firm at equilibrium © With necessary illustrations, describe the conventional conditions for profit maximization for any typical profit firm (c) Consider a typical profit a firm that sells product X whos selling price is P= 100 – 2Q, with cost function of C= 50+ 0.5Q. Using 1* order condition, (i) determine the profit maximizing Q (ii) what would be the profit maximizing Revenue?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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