A sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is defined as O A) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a static game. O B) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a dynamic game. O ) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in a single subgame of a dynamic game. D) the game within the game.

A sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is defined as O A) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a static game. O B) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a dynamic game. O ) a set of strategies that are a Nash equilibrium in a single subgame of a dynamic game. D) the game within the game.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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Which of the following statements about Nash Equilibria in a two-player one-shot simultaneous game is FALSE? O If one player has a dominant strategy, a Nash Equilibrium is guaranteed. O If both players have a dominant strategy, a Nash Equilibrium is guaranteed. O A Nash Equilibrium is conditional on at least one player having a dominant strategy. O It is possible for a game in pure strategies to not have a Nash Equilibrium. It is possible for a two-person game to have more than two Nash Equilibria.
Question 1 What differentiates a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium from a Nash Equilibrium? O A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium requires that play in every subgame be perfectly informed, which Nash Equilibrium does not. O A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium requires every that play in every subgame conform to a Nash Equilibrium. Nash Equilibrium itself does not. O Nash Equilibrium can involve mixed strategies, and a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium cannot. O A Nash Equilibrium cannot contain incredible threats, but a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium can. O Nash Equilibrium is only for strategic games. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is only for extensive form games. Question 2 What are the necessary components of a strategic game? O The matrix, the payoffs in each cell, the strategies. The players and their strategy sets. O The players, their strategy sets, and the payoff functions for each player. O The players, the game, and the equipment of their official sponsor Reebok "[slogan…
Player 2 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy 1 (9,3) (2,4) Player 1 Strategy 2 (6,5) (5,6) Consider the game depicted in the table above. The payout for player 1 is given first in parenthesis, with Player 2's payout second. Does either player have a dominant strategy? O Player one has a dominant strategy. O Player two has a dominant strategy. O Both players have a dominant strategy O Neither player has a dominant strategy.
QUESTION 1 Consider a simultaneous game where player A has a dominant strategy and player B has two strategies (none of which is a dominant strategy). How many pure strategy Nash equilibria will this game have? O Either 1 or 2 O Exactly 2 O Exactly 1 O None
The extensive form of a game is drawn when O a) the players move sequentially. Ob) the players move simultaneously. O c) there is no Nash equilibrium. O d) there are multiple Nash equilibria. O e) the game is often repeated.
Which one of the following statements is incorrect? O A. A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. O B. For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction. O C. A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation. O D. A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation.
Which of the following statements is true? O If a strategy is weakly dominant, then it is also strictly dominant. O None of the other answers is correct. O Games with strictly dominant strategies guarantee that players achieve the highest available payoffs in Nash Equilibrium. OIf a two-player game has a strictly dominant strategy for one player, then it does not necessarily have a strictly dominant strategy for the other player. O The prisoners' dilemma game has no strictly dominant strategy.
Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 0 1 O O 1.5 Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 3 O 6 Player 2 If the game is repeated finitely many times, what happens in the last period in Nash equilibrium? Both players choose C. Player 1 chooses C, Player 2 chooses D. Player 1 chooses D, Player 2 chooses C. Both players choose D. Defect (D) 0,8 1,1 If the game is repeated infinitely many times, what is the value of 1's future payoffs when both cooperate forever? Assume that the discount factor is 0.5 (i.e. payoffs in the next period are worth half as much as payoffs today).
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Which of the following accurately describes a player's strictly dominant strategy? O It is a strategy that is better than all the player's other strategies, no matter what the other players do. There is always at least one player who has one in every game.. O It is the strategy a player uses in the Nash equilibrium of a game. Since a Nash equilibrium always exists, players always have a strictly dominant strategy. O It is a strategy that is better than all the player's other strategies, no matter what the other players do. A player may or may not have one. O It is a strategy that is better than all the player's other strategies, no matter what the other players do. Every player has a dominant strategy in every game.. O It is the strategy a player uses in the Nash equilibrium of a game. Since a Nash equilibrium may not exist, players may not always have a strictly dominant strategy.
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