A monopolist knows there are two customers with different demand curves for two differently sized bags of potato chips. Customer S would only buy the small bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=160-2q (where P denotes the price and q denotes the quantity). Customer L would buy the large bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=200-q. The monopolist does not know who is customer S and who is customer L. Marginal cost of production is zero. BEFORE second degree price discrimination, and if the monopolist perfectly price discriminated the small bag, what is the price of the small bag?

A monopolist knows there are two customers with different demand curves for two differently sized bags of potato chips. Customer S would only buy the small bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=160-2q (where P denotes the price and q denotes the quantity). Customer L would buy the large bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=200-q. The monopolist does not know who is customer S and who is customer L. Marginal cost of production is zero. BEFORE second degree price discrimination, and if the monopolist perfectly price discriminated the small bag, what is the price of the small bag?

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter8: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10SQP

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