A decision-maker must choose between two lotteries, L₁ and L2. The lottery L₁ gives 0 dollars with probability 1/4 and 20 dollars with probability 3/4, whereas L2 gives 12 dollars for sure. The decision-maker is an expected utility maximizer with utility u(w), where w is the change in the consumers wealth. Assume that u(-) is continuous and strictly increasing. (a) Suppose that the decision-maker is risk averse. Can you determine which lottery she will choose? (b) Suppose that someone who knows the outcome of the lottery L₁ is willing to sell the information to the decision-maker. If the decision-maker is risk neutral, how much would she be willing to pay to know the outcome of lottery L₁ before making her choice between L₁ and L₂? (c) Suppose that the decision-maker is risk loving and, as in (b), she can buy information about the outcome of lottery L₁ prior to making her choice between L₁ and L₂. Is she willing to pay a positive amount to know the outcome of the lottery?

A decision-maker must choose between two lotteries, L₁ and L2. The lottery L₁ gives 0 dollars with probability 1/4 and 20 dollars with probability 3/4, whereas L2 gives 12 dollars for sure. The decision-maker is an expected utility maximizer with utility u(w), where w is the change in the consumers wealth. Assume that u(-) is continuous and strictly increasing. (a) Suppose that the decision-maker is risk averse. Can you determine which lottery she will choose? (b) Suppose that someone who knows the outcome of the lottery L₁ is willing to sell the information to the decision-maker. If the decision-maker is risk neutral, how much would she be willing to pay to know the outcome of lottery L₁ before making her choice between L₁ and L₂? (c) Suppose that the decision-maker is risk loving and, as in (b), she can buy information about the outcome of lottery L₁ prior to making her choice between L₁ and L₂. Is she willing to pay a positive amount to know the outcome of the lottery?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

1. A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the occurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wagers W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and o if it does not. Assume that the Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = -e-rx with r>0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA?
a. Suppose that you took part in a lottery that has a chance to increase, decrease or have no effect on your level of income. With probability 0.5, your income remains at it original level K500; with 0.2 probability, your income increases to K700; and with probability 0.3, your income decreases to K400. The utility function is.u（1） =I^0.7where I denote income leveli.Using the utility function show that the consumer's risk preference is averse. (2marks)ii.Calculate both the EU and EV of the income. (4marks)iii.Using the results in (il) above, indicate the attitude to risk of this consumer. (2marks)
2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?
5. Consider a weather forecaster who is paid based on her performance. Each day, she forecasts the probability q = [0, 1] that it will rain the following day. She is given a bonus that depends on her forecast and whether it rains. Assume that the forecaster knows the true probability, p, and when choosing her forecast, q, cares only about maximizing her bonus for that day (in particular, she may lie about the probability if doing so increases her pay). (a) Suppose the bonus is equal to the percentage the forecast assigns to what actually happens. For example, if the forecaster says there is a 72% chance of rain (i.e. q = 0.72), then she is paid $72 if it rains and $28 if it does not rain. If the forecaster is a risk neutral expected utility maximizer, what forecast will she make (as a function of p)? (b) Suppose instead that the bonus is equal to 100(1 − (1 − q)2) dollars if it rains and 100(1-q²) dollars if it does not rain. For example, if the forecaster says there is an 80% chance…
5. Consider a decision-maker who expects to have a car accident with chance ; if this occurs, he will incur $L in damages. He can purchase as much auto insurance, q, as he likes, at a price of p per dollar of coverage: this means that if he pays pq upfront (as the insurance premium), he'll receive a payment of q from the insurance company if an accident occurs. (a) Write out his expected utility from purchasing insurance level q, assuming a utility-of- wealth function u(w) and initial wealth wo. 1 (b) Show that the optimal level of insurance, q, solves u' (wo - L + (1 - p)q)) u' (wo - pq) = p(1 - π) T(1-P) (c) Now assume that u(w) 1 - e-aw, where a > 0 (this is known as a "CARA", or "constant absolute risk aversion", utility function; a parametrizes risk aversion). Solve explicitly for the optimal insurance, and show that it does not depend on wealth.
Consider a risk-neutral agent who maximizes expected utility of wealth facing a lottery with a "bad" (wealth remains the same) and a "good" (wealth increases by a small amount) outcome (both with non-zero probabilities). For this agent, O the certainty equivalent will be zero, but the risk premium will be greater than zero. O the certainty equivalent will be greater than zero, but the risk premium will be zero. O the certainty equivalent will be greater than zero, but the risk premium will be less than zero. O the certainty equivalent will be less than zero, but the risk premium will be greater than zero. O the certainty equivalent and the risk premium will both be zero. there is not enough information to make statements about the certainty equivalent and the risk premium.
Suppose that an individual is just willing to accept a gamble to win or lose $1000 if the probability ofwinning is 0.6. Suppose that the utility gained if the individual wins is 100 utils. How much utility does one lose if one loses the gamble?
1. Now, imagine that Port Chester decides to crack down on motorists who park illegally by increasing the number of officers issuing parking tickets (thus, raising the probability of a ticket). If the cost of a ticket is $100, and the opportunity cost for the average driver of searching for parking is $12, which of the following probabilities would make the average person stop parking illegally? Assume that people will not park illegally if the expected value of doing so is negative. Check all that apply. A. 9% B. 18% C. 17% D. 10% 2. Alternatively, the city could hold the number of officers constant and discourage parking violations by raising the fine for illegal parking. Suppose the average probability of getting caught for parking illegally is currently 10% citywide, and the average opportunity cost of parking is, again, $12. The fine that would make the average person indifferent between searching for parking and parking illegally is ____ , assuming that people will not…
A person has wealth of $500,000. In case of a flood her wealth will be reduced to $50,000. The probability of flooding is 1/10. The person can buy flood insurance at a cost of $0.10 for each $1 worth of coverage. Suppose that the satisfaction she derives from c dollars of wealth (or consumption) is given by u(c) = √c. Let CF denote the contingent commodity dollars if there is a flood (horizontal axis) and CNF denote the contingent commodity dollars if there is no flood (vertical axis). (a) Determine the contingent consumption plan if she does not buy insurance. (b) Determine the contingent consumption plan if she buys insurance $K. (c) Use your answer in (b) to eliminate K and construct the budget constraint (BC) that gives the feasible contingent consumption plans for different amounts of insurance K. Determine the slope of budget line (both graphically and by forming the price ratio).
4. Kate has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(x1,x2) = m7. She currently has $2025. a. Would she be willing to undertake a gamble that involves a gain $2875 with probability + and a loss of $1125 with probability ? Show your work and explain your answer. b. Would she be willing to undertake a gamble that involves a gain $2599 with probability and a loss of $800 with probability ? Show your work and explain your answer.
A person has wealth of $500,000. In case of a flood her wealth will be reduced to $50,000. The probability of flooding is 1/10. The person can buy flood insurance at a cost of $0.10 for each $1 worth of coverage. Suppose that the satisfaction she derives from c dollars of wealth (or consumption) is given by u(c) = √c. Let C denote the contingent commodity dollars if there is a flood (horizontal axis) and CNF denote the contingent commodity dollars if there is no flood (vertical axis). 1 Determine the contingent consumption plan if she does not buy insurance. 2 Assume that the person has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on the contingent consumption plans. Write down the expected utility U(CF, CNF) and derive the MRS. 3 Solve for optimal (CF, CNF). To this end, first use the tangency condition (TC) to find the relation between the two contingent commodities (CF, CNF). Next, use (BC) to solve for their values. What is the optimal amount of insurance K the person will buy? (Note:…
1. A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the o ccurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wager s W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and if it does not. Assume that t he Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = -e-TX with r> 0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA?