1. Find all mixed strategy Nash Equilibria for the games below. How many Nash Equilibriado these games have (including both pure and mixed strategy)?Player 2A)RPlayer 12,24,1E1.43,3B)Player 2Xya4,02,13,2Player 1b2,23,40,12,21,20,3c)Player 3: APlayer 2Xya2,0,41,1,11,2,3,Player 13,2,30,1,02,1,3b1,0,20,0,33,1,1Player 3: BPlayer 2Xy2,0,34,1,21,2,2aPlayer 1b1,3,22,2,20,4,00,0,03,0,32,1,0

Nash equilibrium refers to a set of strategies playing which no player will get an incentive by…

1. Find all mixed strategy Nash Equilibria for the games below. How many Nash Equilibria do these games have (including both pure and mixed strategy)? Player 2 A) L Player 1 D 2,2 4,1 E 1,4 3,3 B) Player 2 y z a 4,0 2,1 3,2 Player 1 b 2,2 3,4 0,1 2,2 1,2 0,3 c) Player 3: A Player 2 y a 2,0,4 1,1,1 1,2,3, Player 1 3,2,3 0,1,0 2,1,3 1,0,2 0,0,3 3,1,1 Player 3: B Player 2 y a 2,0,3 4,1,2 1,2,2 Player 1 1,3,2 2,2,2 0,4,0 0,0,0 3,0,3 2,1,0

1. Find all mixed strategy Nash Equilibria for the games below. How many Nash Equilibria do these games have (including both pure and mixed strategy)? Player 2 A) L Player 1 D 2,2 4,1 E 1,4 3,3 B) Player 2 y z a 4,0 2,1 3,2 Player 1 b 2,2 3,4 0,1 2,2 1,2 0,3 c) Player 3: A Player 2 y a 2,0,4 1,1,1 1,2,3, Player 1 3,2,3 0,1,0 2,1,3 1,0,2 0,0,3 3,1,1 Player 3: B Player 2 y a 2,0,3 4,1,2 1,2,2 Player 1 1,3,2 2,2,2 0,4,0 0,0,0 3,0,3 2,1,0

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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