Please please answer all four subparts with explanation.I will really really upvote. Thanks The following payoff table shows profit for a decision analysis problem with two decision alternatives and three states of nature.States of NatureDecisionAlternative2601103511011085The probabilities for the states of nature are P(s,) = 0.65, P(s,) = 0.15, and P(s,) – 0.20.(a) What is the optimal decision strategy if perfect information were available?If s, then 2If s, then ?; If s, then ?(b) What is the expected value for the decision strategy developed in part (a)?(© Using the expected value approach, what is the recommended decision without perfect information? What is its expected value?The recommended decision without perfect information is ?EV =(d) What is the expected value of perfect information?EVPI =

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Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.5IP

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First Player can invest $1.00 with Second Player (low reliance) or $2.00 (high reliance). Based on the payoffs shown below, what is the probability of performance that makes High Reliance optimal? Write your answer as a two digit integer. E.g., if the answer is 33%, write 33. Second Player Perform Breach Invest & Low Reliance 0.25 1.0 First Player 0.25 -1.0 Invest & High Reliance 0.5 1.0 0.75 -2.0
Suppose that a car - rental agency offers insurance for a week that costs $125. A minor fender bender will cost 34000 whereas a major accident might cost $16 comma 000 in repairs. Without the insurance, you would be personally liable for any damages. There are two decision alternatives: take the insurance, or do not take the insurance. You researched insurance industry statistics and found out that the probability of a major accident is 0.04% and that the probability of a fender bender is 0.18%. The expected payoff if you buy the insurance is $125.00. The expected payoff if you do not buy the insurance is $12.52. Develop a utility function for the payoffs associated with this decision for a risk-averse person. Determine the decision that would result using the utilities instead of the payoffs. Based on the expected payoffs, the best decision is to not purchase the insurance. Are these two decisions consistent?
1. Suppose a company can select among two decisions (d1 and d2) and face three states of nature (s1, s2 and s3) with the following payoff table: Decision s1 s2 s3 d1 d2 150 200 200 50 200 500 The probabilities of s1, s2, and s3 are unknown. Using the optimistic approach, what is the optimal decision and what is the value of the payoff? Place the optimal decision in the first answer box and the maximum payoff used to arrive at this decision in the second. Question 6 options: 2. Suppose a company can select among two decisions (d1 and d2) and face three states of nature (s1, s2 and s3) with the following payoff table: Decision s1 s2 s3 d1 d2 150 200 200 50 200 500 The probabilities of s1, s2, and s3 are unknown. Using the conservative approach, what is the optimal decision and what is the value of the payoff? Place the optimal decision in the first answer box and the maximum payoff used to derive this solution in the second. Question 7 options: 8 3. Suppose a company must consider two…
Consider the St. Petersburg Paradox problem first discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. The game consists of tossing a coin. The player gets a payoff of 2^n where n is the number of times the coin is tossed to get the first head. So, if the sequence of tosses yields TTTH, you get a payoff of 2^4 this payoff occurs with probability (1/2^4). Compute the expected value of playing this game. Next, assume that utility U is a function of wealth X given by U = X.5 and that X = $1,000,000. In this part of the question, assume that the game ends if the first head has not occurred after 40 tosses of the coin. In that case, the payoff is 240 and the game is over. What is the expected payout of this game? Finally, what is the most you would pay to play the game if you require that your expected utility after playing the game must be equal to your utility before playing the game? Use the Goal Seek function (found in Data, What-If Analysis) in Excel.
Suppose that a decision is faced with three decision alternatives and four states of nature. The following profit payoff table is constructed: Alternatives State of Nature S1 S2 S3 S4 Α1 18 12 15 8 Α2 15 14 10 11 13 16 19 15 Α3 Assuming that the decision maker has no knowledge about the probabilities of occurrence of the four states of nature, find the decisions to be recommended under each of the following criteria: i. Maximin criterion ii. Maximax criterion iii. Minimax Reject criterion
Cost-Benefit Analysis Suppose you can take one of two summer jobs. In the first job as a flight attendant, with a salary of $5,000, you estimate the probability you will die is 1 in 40,000. Alternatively, you could drive a truck transporting hazardous materials, which pays $12,000 and for which the probability of death is 1 in 10,000. Suppose that you're indifferent between the two jobs except for the pay and the chance of death. If you choose the job as a flight attendant, what does this say about the value you place on your life?
A risk-neutral plaintiff in a lawsuit must decide whether to settle a claim or go to trial. The defendants offer $50,000 to settle now. If the plaintiff does not settle, the plaintiff believes that the probability of winning at trial is 50% if the plaintiff wins, the amount awarded to the plaintiff is X Will the plaintif settle if x is $62,500? What if X-$250,000? What is the critical value of X that would make the plaintiff indifferent between setting and going to trial? it the plaintiff were risk averse instead of risk neutral, would this critical value of X be higher or lower? If the amount to be awarded at trial with a win (X) were $62,500, then the plaintiff would settle If the amount to be awarded at trial with a win (X) were $250,000, then the plaintiff would not settle The critical value of X that would make the plaintiff indifferent between settling and going to trial is $ (Enter your response using rounded to wo decimal places)
A risk-eutral plaintiff in a lawsuit must decide whether to settle a claim or go to trial. The defendants offer $70,000 to settle now. If the plaintiff does not settle, the plaintiff believes that the probability of winning at trial is 40%. If the plaintiff wins, the amount awarded to the plaintiff is X. Will the plaintiff settle if X is $87,500? What if X= $280,000? What is the critical value of X that would make the plaintiff indifferent between settling and going to trial? If the plaintiff were risk averse instead of risk neutral, would this critical value of X be higher or lower? If the amount to be awarded at trial with a win (X) were $87,500, then the plaintiff would settle If the amount to be awarded at trial with a win (X) were $280,000, then the plaintiff would not settle The critical value of X that would make the plaintiff indifferent between settling and going to trial is $. (Enter your response using rounded to two decimal places.)
5. Shift-in-charge Nazar Al Rushdy: Nazar is pessimistic about the market price. What is your guidance for Nazar? The decision to employ decision trees in crucial situations has been taken by Salem Al Harthi, the plant manager. The table below presents data on demand for a duration of 6 hours along with their respective probabilities. The first row of the table provides the probability of demand for the initial three hours when a leak occurs, denoted in parentheses. Subsequently, the following three rows indicate the probabilities of high, medium, and low demand for the succeeding three hours. To illustrate, if the initial 3-hour market price was low, the probabilities of high demand, medium demand, and low demand in the next three hours are 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5, respectively. Market price High Market price Medium Initial 3-hrs (0.2) Initial 3-hrs (0.5) Market price Low Initial 3-hrs (0.3) High demand (next (0.5) (0.4) (0.2) 3 hrs) Medium demand (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (next 3 hours) Low demand…
A construction company needs to move lumber onto the roof of a building. If the lumber falls and hits someone it will cause $1,200,000 in damage. Assume that company must choose between the following levels of precaution: Spend $500 and the probability of an accident is .05 Spend $5,000 and the probability of an accident is .01 Spend $8,000 and the probability of an accident is .008 Spend $10,000 and the probability of an accident is .003 If the construction company is strictly liable for the costs of the accident, how much would they spend on precaution? A. $500 B. $5,000 C. $8,000 D. $10,000
Leora has a monthly income of $20,736. Unfortunately, there is a chance that she will have an accident that will result in costs of $10,736. Thus leaving her an income of only $10,000. The probability of an accident is 0.5. Finally assume that her preferences over income can be represented by the utility function u(x) = 2ln(x).a) What is the expected income? What is Leora’s expected utility (you may leave in log form)? b) What is the certainty equivalent to her situation? What is the risk premium associated with her situation?c) What is the maximum that Leora would be willing to pay for a full insurance policy?d) Illustrate her expected utility, expected wealth, certainty equivalent, the risk premium and her willingness to pay for a full insurance policy in a diagram.
In the field of financial management, it has been observed that there is a trade-off between the rate of return that one earns on investments and the amount of risk that one must bear to earn that return. a) Draw a set of indifference curves between risk and return for a person that is risk-averse (a person that does not like risk).