ove lyer 3. chooses a number r; in the range 1 < r; < 2. The payoff functions are

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter16: Bargaining
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Consider a simultaneous-move three-player game where player i, i = 1,2, 3, chooses a
number r; in the range 1 <r; < 2. The payoff functions are
T1 = 1- rı + 2r2 – 3r3
T2 = 1+ r1 +4r2 + 2r3
TT3 = (3 – rị – r2)r3
(This is question 8, page 211 of the text.)
(a) Find all Nash equilibria.
(b) Find all Nash equilibria where no player uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a simultaneous-move three-player game where player i, i = 1,2, 3, chooses a number r; in the range 1 <r; < 2. The payoff functions are T1 = 1- rı + 2r2 – 3r3 T2 = 1+ r1 +4r2 + 2r3 TT3 = (3 – rị – r2)r3 (This is question 8, page 211 of the text.) (a) Find all Nash equilibria. (b) Find all Nash equilibria where no player uses a weakly dominated strategy.
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