Boeing and Airbus are duopoly competitors for airplanes. Let us assume that worldwide market demand for airplanes is given by p=10000 -5Q and that costs of production are identical for both manufacturers and specified as C(q) -2q Calcute market price and total quantity if a) Airbus and Boeing are in Cournot competation b) Airbus and Boeing are in Bertrand competation

Boeing and Airbus are duopoly competitors for airplanes. Let us assume that worldwide market demand for airplanes is given by p=10000 -5Q and that costs of production are identical for both manufacturers and specified as C(q) -2q Calcute market price and total quantity if a) Airbus and Boeing are in Cournot competation b) Airbus and Boeing are in Bertrand competation

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.4P

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