A large group of players each guesses a number between 0 and 300. The winner is the person whose umber is closest to three-fifth of the average guess. What is the Nash equilibrium? Will it be observed? What do you expect for the outcome of this game with next year's 203 class? (Considering that they have similar sophistication to your class but they have not covered game theory yet.)

A large group of players each guesses a number between 0 and 300. The winner is the person whose umber is closest to three-fifth of the average guess. What is the Nash equilibrium? Will it be observed? What do you expect for the outcome of this game with next year's 203 class? (Considering that they have similar sophistication to your class but they have not covered game theory yet.)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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